1: Niederle--43 E-5 1911 E16 Slavic People E16
Poland EA1

P SP 175 648 external development. From their primitive homeland located in the basins of the Oder, of the Warta, and of the Vistula, they sought to spread out in all directions. But they encountered in the west the resistance of the Germans; they were unable to overcome it; they were even compelled to give way and they sought to assure their existence and expansion by constant fights and invasions against the Prussians, the Lithuanians, and the Russians. Obviously, the Poles clearly recognized that one of their first tasks was to maintain in the north a wide passageway to the sea and in the west, their frontier on the Oder, if not on the Elbe. Unfortunately all of the advantages, all of the conquests which they gained in this direction were of a purely ephemeral character. A terrible blow fell upon them through the Tatar invasion and through the battle of Legnica--An German--Liegnitz/ (1241). It broke the bonds which united Silesia with Poland and threw this province into the arms of Germany, who began to Germanize it. Another check was the summons of the Teutonic Knights into the country of Chelm and of Loba (1226) which facilitated the Germanization of the seacoast. P SP [563] Finally, let us point out the German colonization which the ecclesiastical or lay princes invoked, beginning with the thirteenth century, in Silesia, into Little Poland, Great Poland and Mazovie; these colonies did not become assimilated and remained completely German in language and customs. Thus a grave peril for Polish nationality was created and developed. "Exterminare idioma Polonicum" /exterminate the Polish language/ became the order of the day for the Germans on the western froniter. Beginning with the thirteenth century, the Polish nationality appeared to be gravely compromised.

P SP 175 648 However, it succeeded in escaping from this peril.[1] The clergy showed themselves to be highly patriotic; literature was born and exercised a happy influence upon all classes of society. The Hussite movement also exercised its influence in Poland against the Germans. The dynasty followed a national political line. It accomplished noteworthy successes, P especially over the Teutonic Knights, who were defeated at Grunwald SP 175 in 1410. In truth, the provinces beyond the Oder and to the north 648 could not be saved. The Poles lost three-quarters of their primitive 668 domain; but what they lost in the west, they attempted to regain in the east, that is toward the northeast, and toward the southeast. This double direction was imposed upon them by the very nature of the terrain; in the center, the basin of the Pripet presented an inhospitable and insurmountable area; to the south rose the barrier of the Carpathians. The Polish flood had to direct itself on the one hand towards Lithuania,

1 [Germanization of the Polish nationality beginning with the 13th century -- Analyst]

1: Niederle--66 E-5 1911 E16 Slavic Peoples E16
Czechoslovakia E81

S.P. C. 175 167 and especially Premysl Otakar II (1253-1278) and their successors; the nobility and the clergy, /104/ particularly the monks, followed their example. As a result of this colonization, the Czech element found itself blockaded in the interior of the country by a belt of German cities and towns, a belt which continually drew tighter; at first below the Metallic Mountains and the Boehmerwald, then on the lower Elbe, then in the areas of Liberec (Reichenberg), Trutnov, Kladsko (Glatz) and in the region of the Jeseniky (Gesenke) Mountains. Moreover, German groups settled in the interior of the country. From the thirteenth century Bohemia and Moravia became bilingual countries.

S.P. C. [191]

From the standpoint of area the German zone was neither wide nor compact; it formed itself especially in the clearings of the forests on the west and northwest.

S.P. C. 101 563

In the fourteenth century, according to Professor Sedlaczek, the frontier of the nations in Bohemia ran from Kynwart* toward Zdar*, Kralupy, Chomutov (Komotau) which was German, toward Most, then toward Duchcov and Decin. Bilina and Teplice were still Czech. Then the frontier ran to Benesov* which was German, to Jablonna*, crossed Mount Iestied* and reached the sources of the Jizera (Iser). From the fourteenth century Liberec (in German, Reichenberg) was German. The Germans were settled in the mountains beyond Vrchlaby* (today Hohenelbe) which was still Czech. Pilnikov (Pillnitz), Trutnow, Zacler, Stare Buky* were already German. Starkov* remained Czech, but the region of Brumov*, and the country of Kladsko /105/were Germanized. Olesnica and Rokytnice* were Czech. Beyond Policzka* and Litomysl* the situation was as it is today. At Nemecky Brod there was a German island; Jindrichuv Hradec was mixed, as well as Budejovice (Budweiss). Krumlov and Prachatice were mixed; the Kasperk Mountains were German; in the region of Domazlice the frontier was Czech. Klatovy was mixed, Tachov German.

S.P. C. 175 167 S.P. [565]

Less is known about the German penetration into Moravia and into Silesia. From the thirteenth century the greater part of the fortified towns in Moravia have been German. In many of the cities, notably at Brno and at Olomouc, from the thirteenth century on a German bourgeoisie developed. The religious orders and the clergy contributed in summoning the Germans, especially Bishop Bruno who has been called the greatest Germanizer of Moravia. In the Teschen area the Czecho-Polish frontier has been the same from the fourteenth century

S.P. C. 101

conflicts which are breaking out constantly along the Czecho-German frontier, we are very well acquainted with this boundary and it is the one which has been studied most among the Slav peoples. Beginning west of Novy Postrekov* near Domazlice it runs to the north of Klence*, goes around Stankov*, runs toward Manetin, goes around Rakovnik, passes west of Rouny, to Terezin (Theresienstadt) on the Elbe.

On the Oharka River the Czech element has penetrated recently into the industrial basins of Duchcov, of Most (Brux) and of Teplice (Teplitz). From Litomerice (Leitmeritz) the boundary follows in general the right bank of the Elbe, passes by Libechov*, by Bela* (Weiswasser*), runs up north towards Svetla*, passes by Skuhrov*, and reaches near the frontier the most northern Czech village, Paseky*; then it descends to the southeast in the direction of Jaromer and goes up towards Upice, where it passes into Prussian Silesia in which a dozen Czech villages may be counted. Then it runs south again, goes around the Orlice* Mountains and enters Moravia at Silperk*. In this province, the boundary /113/ through Pisarov*, Bludov*, Podstat*, meets the Silesian frontier, runs around Novy Jicin, goes up again to the Silesian frontier and runs towards Neplachovice* on the Prussian frontier. It goes into the interior of Prussian Silesia and reaches the Polish frontier (1) at Sulov* where it descends again towards the south-

1. We omit here a long enumeration of localities which it would be impossible to find except upon a detailed map.

west, towards Hodonin and follows the course of the Morava; then it runs to Dacice, to Chlumice*, to Suchodol*, to Kaplice where it goes up towards the northwest by Krumlov, Vimperk, Lusice*, and joins Postrekov*.

S.P. C. 101 ●563

In this Czech region[1] there is a certain number of German islands:

That of Budejovice (Budweiss) includes several communities. In the district about this city the number of Germans is diminishing greatly; Jihlava (Iglau) in Moravia; Brno (Brunn). That of Rousinov*, of Vyskov*, and of Olomouc (Ollmutz) in Moravia, and the largest, the most feared of all in the region of Lanskroun*, Mohelnice*, Moravska Trebova* (Moehrisch Trubau*), Svitau* and Brezov*, surrounded by Czech towns. The towns of Krumlov in Moravia, and of Hodonin also have a majority of Germans. (1) There are on the other /114/ hand

1 [Morava – Analyst]

1: Niederle--72 E-5 1911 E/6 Slavic Peoples E/6
Czechoslovakia EB1
S.P. C. 101 563

1. The following were the numbers of Czechs and of Germans in a certain number of the towns in 1900: Brno, 38,365 and 68,762; Olomouc (Olmutz), 6,798 and 13,982; Jihlava, 4,228 and 19,765; Znojmo, 1,854 and 14,014; Hodonin, 3,987 and 4,976; Krumlov, 879 and 1,233.

Czech islands, but rather weak ones, in Lower Austria and in Prussian Silesia, where one may find names which recall national traditions, such as those of Husinec, and of Podebrady, of Tabor Veliky and Tabor Maly., etc.

S.P. C. 101

On the other hand, the Czechs are very numerous in Vienna (more than 350,000), in Linz, Budapest (4,100), Berlin, Dresden (3,188), and Svitavy (Zwittau). They are still to be found in Galicia in the district of Zolkiew, in the Hungarian Banat, in Croatia-Slavonia (31,587 of them have been counted; they came mainly between 1880 and 1890). In Hungary many of the localities which are named Csehi recall the memory of former colonies. Some of them already are Slovakized. In Russia, in the Volhynia, beginning in 1868, colonies were established in the districts of Dubno*, Rovny*, Lutsk, Zhitomir, Ostrog, Vladimir, Glinsk*, Zdolbonov, and Kupichevo*--the last three are the most considerable--in the Crimea, at Bohemka and Czechobrod* and near Novorossiisk* at Kirilovka-Metodievka and Gliebovka*, in Poland at Kuczow*, Zelow*, Lodz. 50,385 Czechs have been counted in Russia, 50% of whom are in Volhynia, 4,978 in the government of Lodz, 3,360 in the Caucasus. In Bulgaria, there are Czech colonies at Voivodov* and at Brslianisi* near Plevna.

On the other hand, many Czechs have settled in the United States, notably in Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, the /115/ states of New York, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin; the number is estimated at half a million. In New Zealand there is near Auckland the Czecho-German colony of Puhoj (about 800 Czechs).

S 22. The region of the Slovaks is now very well known in Hungary. It starts at Devinska Nova Ves--near the place where the Morava empties into the Danube--runs along the Moravian frontier and that of Galicia (1) towards Stropkov (Hung., Sztropko) to the north

1. This line envelops a few Polish and Russian localities.

of Zemplen. From Stropkov it runs to Breznice, Papin*, V. Remety in the county of Uzhorod (Ungvar), reaches Huta*, the most eastern Slovak village, then it turns about towards the west through Lucenec, Levice, Vrable, whence it thrusts out a point towards the south as far as Nove

S.P.C. 543 162 In Bohemia 50,000 Jews declared themselves to be Czechs, and in Moravia 6,792; 40,521 in Bohemia and 34,261 in Moravia declared that they were Germans. Hungary actually possesses one-tenth of the Jews of the entire world, and they are increasing more rapidly than the other national groups (14.8%). Almost all of them claim that they are Magyars.

S.P.C. 177 668 In studying the history and the ethnography of the Czecho-Slovaks, one sees that the Czechs began by losing much more territory than they gained. But this unfortunate situation has ceased; the national consciousness has developed; the spirit of an entire people has set up a solid barrier against the Germanic invasion. Certain losses are still inevitable, but they can be retrieved. The most threatene section is made up of the frontier of northern Moravia where the Germans today are concentrating their strength. They wish to unite their compact masses with the islands of Lanskroun, Zabreh, Olomouc and to cut Bohemia from Moravia. It is here that the Czech nation should especially think of acting and defending itself.

S.P.C. 161 Moreover, the increase of the Czechs with respect to that of the Germans is good. During the last ten years the Czechs have increased by 8.49% and the Germans only by 1.96%.

/124/ In the German region the Czechs have increased by 0.1% and in the Czech region the Germans gave decreased by 0.5%. The least favored region from a Czech viewpoint is that of Moravska Ostrava (Mochrisch Ostrau), where the Czechs are greatly decreasing.

ooo It is important to reinforce the Czech element upon the frontier, to raise Czech capital in opposition to German money, to set up Czech schools as opposed to German schools, and, in order to stand against all assaults, to strengthen the national consciousness. It is necessary to build up the Czech element from an economic and physical viewpoint, to improve the general well-being, to increase the means of exchanging ideas.

In brief, the progress of the Germans upon the frontier has been so insignificant for the past century, that it will still be hundreds of years before it becomes a cause of concern.

What is much more serious is that the Czech areas are losing

Danube and of the Sava. Towards 1481, 50,000 of them emigrated /153/ form the region of Krusevac, and these migrations were repeated several times from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, especially after the defeat of the Turks before Vienna, in 1683, and after the treaty of Karlovci (Karlowitz) in 1699, as a result of which the Turks were compelled definitely to give up Hungary and Transylvania. The Serb colonization was favorably regarded by Austria, and the Court of Vienna did not hesitate to promise liberties and privileges, of which only very few were later realized. Also, on numerous occasions, notably in 1750 and 1752, the Serbs left the Austrian State and went to settle in Russia, in New Serbia, of which we shall speak later on.[1]

From the outset of the fifteenth century, we find Serb colonies in the island of Czeplo, then later in Srem (Syrmien), Backa (Baczka), the country of Torontal and of Timisoara (Temesvar). The great migration into these countries took place in 1690, under the leadership of Arseniye III Tsmoievitch, patriarch of Ipek (Petch), who led, it is said, 80,000 persons; another took place in 1737 under the leadership of Arseniye Iovanovitch. In Styria, there were Serb colonies near Ptuj from the sixteenth century. The original Slavic domain of ancient Serbia was depopulated to such an extent that it was occupied by Albanian refugees; we can testify even today to the existence of this Albanian wedge which becomes sharper every day, which penetrates into the very heart of ancient Serbia, as far as Kosovo Polje, and which thrusts its point as far as the present kingdom. /154/ Today the region of Kosovo Polje is called Arnautluk (the country of the Arnaut or Albanians) and, according to the information furnished by Nusic, there are very few villages which do not contain Albanians, and there are some which have no Serbs at all, even though they bear Serbian names. Three quarter of the population is made up of Albanianized Serbs. A few years ago the Albanians were even settled in the Principality of Serbia, on the Toplica, Jablanica, and Morava Rivers; they left after the war of 1878 and the region has again been occupied by the Serbs. In 1900 only 2,151 Albanians were counted in Serbia, almost all of them in the district of Vranie, where 205,000 Serbs are found alongside them.

This withdrawal of the Serb national group toward the north was the result of the Turkish wars, and it is only during the past few

1 [cf. cat. 116, p.101 -- Analyst]

1: Niederle--97 E-5 1911 E16 Slavic Peoples
Serbs EF6
Croats EF4

years that Serbia has recognized how much she has lost and how little she has gained: for the region of Novi Pazar and of Kosovo is the keystone of her future. The Albanian question is a vital question to Serbia. S.P. S.B. 167 175 000

Furthermore, in the Serbian section of the Balkan peninsula, there have been many internal migrations between the different regions, migrations which recently have been studied by Mr. Cvijic. In these movements Serbia played a passive role; an active role was played by Hercegovina, by Montenegro, and by a portion of Macedonia. S.P. S.B. 166

/155/ If the Serbs in the southwest withdrew before the Albanians, in the northeast they withdrew before the Rumanians. This is what is found not only in the Hungarian Banat, where a great number of Rumanian villages bear Serb names, but also in the Kingdom of Serbia where, at a bend of the Danube, between Milonovac and Zajecar, the Rumanians have penetrated in compact masses and where the Serbs have been unable to absorb them. It even appears, according to Mr. Resetar, that they are increasing in numbers, even though the official statistics try to diminish their number. For 1900, 89, 873 of them[1] were enumerated; but there were also 32, 556 bilingual persons speaking Serbian. To compensate for these losses, one may point out the success of the Serbo-Croat national group in Dalmatia, where the sea-coast which previously was Roman, is rapidly becoming Slavisized. This Slavisation did not take place immediately upon the arrival of the Slavs in Roman Dalmatia, but was the result of a long process which in part Slavisized the Romans and in part forced them to migrate. It was only in the Seventeenth Century that the Romans disappeared,[2] and a few vestiges of their former tongue remained as a sort of slang in the island of Krk (Veglia) until the end of the nineteenth century. S.P. S.B. 167 563 [191] S.B. 167 S.B. C. [191]

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Split (Spalato) and Dubrovnik (Ragusa) were already Slavic. At the time of the Turkish invasions the Adriatic seacoast was first depopulated, then colonized again. From the neighborhood of Zadar (Zara) Slav colonies crossed into southern Italy /156/ where their descendants can still be found today. We shall speak of them in a short while. S.P. C.r. S.B. 175 167

On the western frontier of Serbia between the Morava, the Timok, and the Pirot, there was for a long time a transitional zone S.P. S.B.

[1] [Rumanians in the Kingdom of Serbia--Analyst] 563

[2] [Along the Dalmation coast--Analyst] 167

S.P. Sb. 163 167

between Serb territory and Bulgar territory. The nationality of the inhabitants of this region has been for a long time a matter of controversy. But since the Serbs have occupied it and have brought to it their civilization, it can no longer be differentiated from the Serbian group. According to Mr. O. Brosh, an analogous phenomenon occurred in the south, in the section of Serbian territory called Old Serbia.

S.P. Cr. Sb. 101

S 30. Territorial Boundaries.--

The Serbo-Croats are divided today among several states. The Croats belong entirely to Austria-Hungary. In fact, they occupy the Slavic section of Istria and of the seacoast, a section of Dalmatia and of Bosnia, all of Croatia and Slavonia, with the exception of Srem (Syrmien), and are scattered besides in western Hungary. The Serbs have their principal nucleus in the Balkan peninsula. They are settled in the independent kingdom, in Bosnia-Hercegovina annexed to Austria, and in a section of Dalmatia, in the independent principality of Montenegro, in the northern sections of the Turkish vilayets of Scutari (Skadar) and of Skoplje, in the north of Slavonia, and they /157/ form sizeable islands in South Hungary.

Because of the great size of the area over which they are scattered, their boundary is poorly defined and it is difficult to trace its outline. It is still more difficult to trace the boundary which separates the Serbs from the Croats. This is how one could mark it approximately: It starts out at the little stream of Dragonja and from the Croat town of Buzet (Pinguente), where the Croats of the two dialects kaikavski and cakavski meet the Slovenes and the Italians; then the border runs down to the south and passes into Istria through Beram (Vermo), Vodnjan (Dignano), and reaches Pula (Pola), then it follows the seashore of the Adriatic as far as the Bojana, which runs into the lake of Skadar (Scutari). Certain cities, Rijeka (Fiume), Zadar (Zara) are in great measure inhabited by the Italians. On the other hand, Sibenik, Trogir (Trau), Split (Spalato) are Slav. However, there are in the Kvarner (Quarnero) Islands some Italian localities.

S.P. Cr. [197]

S.P. Sb. 101

From the Bojana the line which separates the Serbs from the Albanians runs through the middle of the lake of Skadar (Scutari) and passes to the south of the frontier of Montenegro through Sutorman, Vila, Gusinje, Plav, near Pec /Ipek/, then below Djakovica, Prizren, it reaches Mount Chardagh and Mount Karadagh and comes to Vranje

S.P. Cr. Sl. 163

the net increase 0.98%.

In the Kingdom of Serbia, the rate, for a period of ten years, was still greater; gross total, 14.8%, net total, 14.2%, otherwise speaking, the birth rate exceeded the death rate by 1.48%. During these latter years, one notes a much more considerable increase but it results from the large number of migrations of persons fleeing from the Turkish territory. The same may be said for Bosnia and Hercegovina, where, as a result of immigration, an abnormal increase was produced at the end of the last century (from 1879 to 1895, 2.15% on an average). Between 1901 and 1904, the increase was only 0.95% per year.

In the north, the Croats and the Serbs are threatened by the Magyars in Hungary and by the Germans in Croatia. The Magyars and the Germans are greatly increasing in number in Croatia. In the space of ten years, from 1880 to 1890, the Serbo-Croats in this province increased by 12.23%, the Germans by 41.3%, the Magyars by 66.1%. In the years 1890 to 1900, the Slavs increased by 8.96%, the Germans by 13.12%, the Magyars by 36,3%. Thus, between 1880 and 1900, the relative number /168/ of Slavs decreased from 90.48% to 87.22%; that of the Germans increased from 4.4% to 5.53%, that of the Magyars from 2.19% to 3.74%.

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This state of affairs is not yet very serious, but nevertheless it gives rise to concern about the future.

S.P. Cr. Sl. 167

The Serbs and the Croats should agree to resist with a common front, all the more as their birth rate is weak, weaker in the areas inhabited solely by them than in the areas with mixed population and as they are constantly diminished by emigration. Between 1880 and 1900 this took away from them more than 100,000 souls and in these recent times the Croats have emigrated in rather large numbers into the two sections of America.

S.P. Sl. 795 162

We have already pointed out the decrease in the numbers of Serbs in the area of Novi Pazar and Kosovo. Alongside the Orthodox Serbs there are to be found today in this zone many Albanianized Mohammedan Serbs--notably of the tribes of the Gash and of the Berish, also 6,000 Cherkessians who settled there in the years 1858-1862. In this zone there are no Turks properly speaking.

S.P. [563]

S.P. Cr. M. 101

to see them as an entirely independent tribe. All are Catholics. No one knows when they arrived. But they probably have been here since the fifteenth century. The latest statistics show them partly as Serbs, partly as Croats, and the Croats also claim them.

Here are still a few other groups. The purely Kajkavski inhabitants of the zupaniate (1) of Zagreb in the western region, between

1. Prefecture.

Samobor and Zumberk, call themselves Prigorci (mountaineers), those who live near the sources of the Kupa, Brajci; one also finds in the neighborhood of Zagreb the names of Berzjaci, Puhovci.

Istria is especially interesting from the viewpoint of such groups. In the north one first meets the Fuckovci who speak Kajkavski and who are so called because of the whistling manner /178/ in which they speak; to the south are the Cicovci, descendants of a Bosnian colony which came in 1532; in the southeast the old Istrian Cakavci distinguish themselves clearly from the later Stokavci colonists who came from Dalmatia and from the ancient Romans, called Vlasi or Morlaci by their neighbors. In Istria, the Rumanians /Romans?/ still maintain themselves in the villages of Zejani, Brda, Grobnik, Iesenovik, Sutnjevica, Lelaj and Nova-Ves. According to the latest statistics the pure-blooded Rumanians form three groups, one of 389, another of 516, the third of 217 persons.

S.P. Cr. Sb. [563]

S.P. Sb. 101

In Serbia a large number of local names has sprung up, borrowed from those of rivers, of mountains, of areas, and of towns. (1) Their

1. We shall not translate them. Translator.

origin is not difficult to trace. In Hungary the ancient name of Rasciens, inhabitants of the Raska, an ancient Serbian province has been kept for the Orthodox Serbs.

Local names have developed also in Bosnia from the names of towns and areas. (2)

S.P. Sb. [563]

2. There are in Bosnia a few groups of Roman origin, who still speak a Romance language. But the greater part declare themselves to be Serbs. They are called Cincari, Achani.

S.P. M. 101

Montenegro has preserved the former division into tribes, whose names are still known by the people. Beginning in the north, one

Serbs E5 Croats E5 Montenegrins E5

S.P. M. 101

finds the Hercegovinians who came from Hercegovina; then to /179/ the northeast the Brda (1) and between the sea and the lake of Skadar (Scutari) the Crna Gora (Black Mountain), so-called, with the Krajna. In Montenegrin Hercegovina there are seven tribes: Grahovo, the Banjani, Opushna, Rudina, Nikticke Rudine, Nikticka Zupa, Piva, Drobnjaci, Saranci. In the region of Brda there live seven tribes which are, beginning from the west: (2) the Bjelopavlici, the Piperi, the Bratonozici, the Kuteki, the Vasojevici, the Moracani, the Rovcani. In ancient Montenegro four nahias are distinguished, each of which is divided into tribes: the nahia of Katun (Cetiniani, or people of Cetinie, Njeguchi, Zeknici, Couče, Kcevo, Ozrinici, Bielice, Komani, Zasarcani, Pjeshivtsi, Lukovo), the nahia Ljeshanska (Zecani), the nahia of Rieka (Cekliniani, Liubotinjani); the nahia of Crmnitsa contains a whole series of little tribes called "brotherhoods." In an area which was previously Serbian there are settled today Albanian and Serbian Mohammedans whose principal tribes are those of the Mrkojevici and of the Mikulici, close to Antivari (Bar).

1. This word in Serbian means "mountains." Translator.

S.P. M. [194]

2. According to Hassert and Kovacevic, the Kuci are of the Albanian race, according to Erdelianovic, of the Serbian race. A certain number of them, the Drekanovici, present a strong mixture of Albanian blood. Erdelianovic considers certain among them (the Boukimirs) as Slavisized Romans.

S.P. M. [563]

According to Zanetov, there is still another special tribe, that /180/ of Siren, on the upper reaches of the Lim and of the Bosnian Bistrica.

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We have attempted to show the respective situations of the Croats and the Serbs, the difference in their political development despite their close kinship, the divergent tendencies, which, as a result of their historic traditions, they both follow with a view to assuring their future.

S.P. 578 Cf. 36. 186

Up to the present, numerous conflicts have occurred between these two groups,[1] and one would be mistaken in believing that the relative calm which prevails today is a guarantee of tolerance and peace. Leaving aside the double ideal of a great Croatia and a great Serbia, an contradictory ideal if there ever was one, we run into an entire series of delicate questions, of conflicts which are constantly aggravated. They are met with in Croatia-Slavonia, in Dalmatia

1 [i.e. Serbs and Croats -- Analyst]

4: Cross L-5 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavs E16

Passau and Vienna, and the area devastated by the Magyars was largely reoccupied by the year 1000.

At this period,[1] German missionary work in the Slavic districts south of the Danube proceeded not from Regensburg or Passau, which were mainly occupied with the German settlements along the Danube, but from Bamberg. Missionaries from this diocese lived among the Slavs of Carinthia which was rapidly settled by colonists from Franconia and the middle Rhineland, as opposed to the predominantly Bavarian origin of the German settlers in Austria itself. While Bamberg was thus active in Carinthia (roughly the valley of the Drave east and west of Villach), Bavarian missionaries from Freising in Bavaria occupied themselves with Carniola (Krain), the region of the Save valley somewhat further southwest (the hinterland of Trieste), and here the colonists were again Bavarian. The Slovene population found by these German newcomers in Carinthia, Carniola, and Styria (originally a portion of Carinthia), was less driven out or exterminated than it was repressed. Documentary evidence reveals German and Slavic personal and place names side by side. The politically and socially dominant class was everywhere German. In Austria along the Danube, from which the Slavic population had been driven by the Avars before Carolingian times, the peasantry was almost exclusively Bavarian. But in Carinthia and Carniola, German peasants lived in close proximity to the native Slovenian peasantry which remained most numerous southwest of the Mur river in the valleys of the Drave and Save. Peculiar conditions on the right bank of the Danube thus explain the southward contraction of the Slovenes away from this river and their constant subservience in later days to Austrian political influence.

German influences in Moravia and their unfortunate consequences for the mission of Constantine and Methodius have already been mentioned. Even while the brothers were still active, the struggle for Frankish supremacy was going on and

[1] [10th century --Analyst]

4: Cross L-5 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavs E16

Levant passed through Breslau and Cracow. The German settlers therefore followed the line of least resistance and were spared the usual hard pioneer work because the soil they occupied had already been under cultivation for long periods. The colonists received exemption from taxes over a certain fixed term, and could build their towns as they desired, living under their native customs and enjoying absolute home rule.

By the middle of the fourteenth century there were some 150 German village settlements in the modern province of Posen alone, and at the same time cities destroyed by the Tartars were resettled by German colonists, who also founded new towns in Polish territory. Among the rebuilt cities largely populated by Germans in the fourteenth century we may note Sandomierz, Cracow, and Breslau, and among major German settlements at previous Polish centers, Gnesen, Posen, Kalish, Lublin, and even Warsaw itself. As late as 1480, three quarters of the burghers of Warsaw had German names. By the metropolitan cities of Germany these settlements were rightly regarded as outposts of German trade and civilization. The proportion of German population in Poland at the middle of the fourteenth century is estimated at 25 per cent, though many of the German colonists were polonized by the sixteenth. The wave of German settlement extended even beyond Cracow into Eastern Galicia toward Przemysl and Lemberg (Lvóv). Until 1470, indeed, no one but Germans sat on the Lemberg city council.

Simultaneously with the conflict between the Teutonic Order and the Prussians, German conquest and colonization pursued its way up the Baltic seaboard toward the Gulf of Finland. Settlers from Lübeck established themselves for trading purposes at the mouth of the Dvina as early as 1150, but the conquest of Livonia did not begin until the year 1200. Riga was founded as a city and as a missionary bishopric in 1201. The militant Order of the Sword Bearers was then organized to combat the Finnish tribes of the seacoast and the Letts of the interior. They were subject to the Bishop of Riga, and

4: Cross L-5 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavs E16

the Austrian authorities, might have had incalculable consequences for the maintenance of their Empire.

The ideals preached by Palacký, who was as great a journalist as he was a historian, were first formulated in political terms just prior to the revolutionary year 1848, which signalized the end of Metternich's regime and the dawn of constitutionalism in Austria. It was thus Palacký who advocated an autonomous Bohemia including all the lands which had formerly belonged to the Bohemian crown, together with as much of Hungary as was populated by Slovaks: the principle, indeed, upon which the Czechoslovak state was subsequently erected. It is significant, moreover, that the German elements in Bohemia were inclined to support the Czechs in their agitation for autonomy. But the federal idea was never realized in Austria-Hungary before the monarchy dissolved in 1918, and Bohemian hopes in this direction were dashed by the Austrian Constitution of 1867, which gave the Hungarians a preferred position, as compared with the Slavs, by establishing the principle of dualism, by making Hungary practically autonomous, and by settling the Magyar domination upon Slovaks and Croats. This loss was to some extent offset by educational concessions to the Czechs, since in the previous twenty years Bohemian national consciousness had consolidated to an extraordinary degree through the increased use of the native language and the improved status of both peasants and the middle class. The romantic emphasis laid by Palacký on the glorious past of Bohemia thus proved an altogether healthy spur to the national ambition.

Though after 1867 there was never any real reconciliation between Prague and Vienna, the material prosperity of Bohemia advanced rapidly in the next fifty years, and the part still played by the German element in Bohemia before the war of 1914 is evidenced by the fact that, though they comprised only 37 per cent of the population, they paid 50 per cent of the taxes. But while the Czechs never lost sight of the federalist ideal, this principle was looked on with disfavor by the Viennese

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autocrats, who felt that any increase in Bohemia's degree of independence would only weaken the whole structure of the unified Austro-Hungarian state. This difference in political philosophy was aggravated by the fact that there was too little will to compromise and too much reverence for history among the Bohemian leaders. Oppressed nations always overestimate the practical importance of past tradition. The dominant position long occupied by the kingdom of Bohemia in the Holy Roman Empire, if the Czechs had only realized it, was of far less moment than any rational compromise which would have permitted Bohemia to enjoy to the full the material advantages it commanded as the most highly industrialized section of Austria-Hungary and, at the same time, to cultivate a national spirit, language and literature, without making itself obnoxious to its neighbors by always harping on the same string. It is, however, an unfortunate truth that the composition, within a state, of quarrels rising from linguistic differences complicated by racial, temperamental, and confessional motives and by the carefully cherished traditions of the past which are, or suppose themselves to be, oppressed, is a problem of baffling complexity. On the other hand, the experience of the twenty years before 1939 definitely showed that this problem is not solved by merely setting up these disaffected areas as national units.

Now while it is true that the Czechs did not find themselves precisely in clover under the Hapsburg monarchy, the fact remains that they achieved a high level of material prosperity and culture during the nineteenth century. They had, to be sure, advanced further along the path of social evolution than the Poles, among whom the middle class had actually contracted when the partitions interrupted the evolution of the nation. When Poland fell there were virtually but two classes in the country, the landowning gentry and the peasants. Serfdom was abolished in the Prussian section in 1821, with a subsequent rapid economic improvement in the peasants' status. After the partitions, the middle class evolved most speedily in the Russian section, and at a slower rate under the German regime.

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Chapter One

SLAVISM MENACES THE WEST

178 THE collapse of Germany inaugurated a revolutionary era in Europe. In the political domain, it was the prelude to transfers of strength whose full consequences cannot yet be gauged, although we can say definitely that it is the Slavs—and primarily the Russians—who will benefit by them.

[162] In this connection, the war has simply hastened a process to which a relentless impulse had already been given by the demographic rhythm of modern Europe. To-day, out of every three Europeans, one is a Slav. In three-quarters of a century from now, with the differing birth-rates in Western and in Eastern Europe, we shall find this ratio reversed.

• 563 [161] On the eve of the war, our continent had 454,400,000 inhabitants. The Slavs numbered 145,072,000, distributed as follows: Poland, 27,181,000; Czechoslovakia, 13,611,000; Yugoslavia, 12,017,000; Bulgaria (a Slavicised rather than a Slav country), 6,080,000; Great Russia, 55,548,000; Little Russia, 27,664,000; White Russia, 4,204,000.[1] It should be mentioned, in passing, that Russia, which common opinion (by metonymy) considers as the 'Slav country' *par excellence,* is on the contrary the only one which, within its State frontiers, includes at least an equal proportion of inhabitants of other races. For this reason it is also, whatever its political structure, the country where the national problem is at least easily reducible to a concept of ethnical homogeneity. It is as well not to forget this.

As far as any biological factor can do so, this prospect of demographic superiority in Europe gives stability and solidity to the political advantages which the Slavonic world may derive from the collapse of its age-long enemy—Germanism.

563 829 We shall use the term 'Slavonic world' or 'Slavonic community', rather than 'Slavonic race'. It was at the time when science was abandoning its convictions regarding race-discrimina-

[161] [1] Between 1930 and 1939 the population of Russia rose from 158 to 192 million, i.e. an annual increase of 3,700,000 persons—which constitutes a world record.

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tion that Hitlerite Germany adopted this discrimination as a creed. We have seen whither this folly led. A less dangerous, but more general, illusion leads historians to falsify the time-perspectives of the events they record by giving to the words 'national conscience' a racial import which is, more often than not, simply a gross anachronism. The most one can concede is that 'race' intervened as a disturbing element in international life at a time when the latter had, to all appearances, lost its homogeneity and its original authentication marks. The case of the Slavs is, in this respect, irrefutably eloquent. If we accept what the learned Genevan anthropologist, Professor Eugène Pittard,[2] has written, we lack precise information, and even clarity, regarding the original populations of the Slav countries; the data are too scanty for us to write their history on an anthropological basis and to establish definite relationships. Great Russians, White Russians and Little Russians present rather widely differing morphological characteristics. Neither does the Polish nation constitute a pure race. The Czechs of Bohemia and those of Moravia cannot be placed on the same level as the Russians and the Poles; on the other hand, Lusatians, Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks *do* seem to be the offshoots of one single ethnical stock. According to M. Pittard, the Slovenes would appear to be only Slavicised; a large proportion of them can be attached to the Adriatic or Dinaric race. The Croats and the Serbs used to form one single group; many of them must belong to this same Dinaric race: they are, again, Slavicised people, anthropologically far removed from the Slavs of the North, that is to say, of the districts today considered as the most specifically Slavonic. The same can probably be said of the Bosnians and the Montenegrins. The Bulgars do not represent a pure race, and different origins are attributed to them: Thracian, Tartar, and others; they too are Slavicised. In short, and without forgetting the reserves with which M. Pittard surrounds conclusions which he is very careful not to put forward as final—the Slavs of the South are probably not related to the Slavs of the North, and the identity of race of the former is apparently itself unconfirmed. Comparing this picture with the emotive manifestations of Slavonic solidarity which

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[2] *Les Races et l'Histoire*, in the collection "L'Evolution de l'Humanité," pp. 273 *sqq.*

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Europe has witnessed during the past century, one is tempted to wonder whether the modern nations are not groups of human beings, mainly united by a common illusion as to their origins and an identical aversion to their neighbours.

But history is often only a distortion of the legend concerning the lives of nations. It matters comparatively little if scholars criticise and refute theories which human societies, wittingly or otherwise, have turned into living realities. Up to the sixteenth century the French believed in their Trojan origin, and even today they place an exaggerated faith in their 'Latinity'.

Consequently, as far as the Slavonic community is concerned, we will keep to the idea of it which is held by its component nations, without discussing its basis. Now it is evident that the feeling of this community, existing in embryo in former centuries, has gone on intensifying during the past hundred years, and to-day constitutes a fundamental factor in European life.

* * *

'The first nation to impose its virile will on the invaders, and decree the destruction of the enemy, was a Slavonic nation', said the German novelist, Heinrich Mann, in a letter he addressed to the Association of Soviet Authors, in May, 1942. It was, indeed, the Russian armies which, at the cost of never-to-be-forgotten steadfastness and unheard-of sacrifices, annihilated the most formidable military organisation the world has ever seen.

This victory represents more than the physical balance-sheet of a trial of strength, the settlement of an account, outstanding for a thousand years, between two nations. Regarded from the angle of European destinies, it is an event of quite different magnitude. It is the prelude to a reintegration of the Slavonic world, hitherto split up among the powers and interests which speculated on its division. For a century, the Western Chancelleries used and abused the word 'Panslavism'. We shall see, later, what to think of this word, which is unknown in the Russian language. But it was nothing more than a diplomatic slogan, a scarecrow utilised by the Habsburg monarchy in times of crisis, with a view to mobilising the West against Tsarist diplomacy. It is only today that we can speak of a Slav

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186* 829 648 solidarity capable of disturbing the balance of power in Europe. And even so, we have to give an objective definition of this solidarity—a task rendered difficult by the traditional prejudices, the historical misinterpretations which, in the minds of many Westerners, have falsified the laws and motives which govern the expansion of Slavism.

• 563 829 No need to go far afield to see the effects of this ignorance of Slavonic realities, even when it is not reinforced by a feeling of animosity. In witness, I will simply cite this passage from a speech pronounced in the Tribunal of the French Senate on May 4, 1933, by the Chairman of the Committee for the Budget on Foreign Affairs:—

> 'That is a point to be noted, *viz.*, the awakening of the Slavonic race. . . . The objection is raised that Rumania is not essentially Slavonic; agreed. But there is Poland, there are the Baltic States, and, farther off still, the wholly Slavonic U.S.S.R., which is, so to speak, the mother of all the Slavonic nations of Central and Eastern Europe'.[1]

These few sentences, from the mouth of an authoritative speaker, contain as many errors as there are words. Rumania is not Slavonic, either essentially or in appearance. Still less the Baltic States. Far from being entirely Slavonic, the Soviet Union is hardly more than fifty per cent so. As for considering it the original habitation of the Slavonic tribes of Central and Eastern Europe, to do this is to settle, with an enviable assurance, a problem whose solution the most eminent ethnologists are still seeking.

Such was, however, the idea current in our official circles, on the eve of this War, concerning one of the determining factors of European peace.

186* 829 208 Even so, the honourable Parliamentarian who pronounced these gross untruths before his colleagues of the Senate was not prompted by malevolence when he spoke of an awakening of the Slavonic nations. This was not always the case with our journalists and their supporters. It would be possible to compile an anthology of ill-disposed or apprehensive judgements on the Slavonic world, from the pens of French intellectuals, or of men responsible for pronouncements on foreign policy. Is it necessary

[1] *Journal Officiel* of May 5 (1933), p. 791, col. 1.

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feature which most reveals the Russian exclusivism that animated the Slavophiles is the very fact that their campaign did not succeed in creating a more effective current of intellectual exchanges. In 1850, 'a young Russian aristocrat asked for a passport to go abroad, in order to study 'Slavonic peoples and ways'. His application was refused, on the grounds that 'between Moscow and Kamchatka there was ample space in which to pursue this branch of study'.

Among the Orthodox Slavs there was, moreover, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, only one State exhibiting a certain independence, and that was Montenegro. After a long period of subjection to Venetian influence, it passed entirely under Russian tutelage. Its prince-bishops sent their nephews to study in Russia, to prepare themselves for rule. Many young Montenegrins settled there, and their descendants included several of the Russian generals who opposed the Great Army.

With this exception, intellectual relations between Slavs and Russians were intermittent and restricted. If, once they had regained their independence, the Serbs and the Bulgars sent their statesmen to St. Petersburg, their students went to Vienna, to Leipzig, or to Paris. Even the Orthodox seminarists often preferred the Protestant Faculty of Tübingen to the Russian religious institutions. In short, the ascendency of Western civilisation remained the chief obstacle to an assimilation of Russian culture by the Slavonic peoples.

The Slavophiles, despite the lack of support (and, very soon, the distrust) which their initiative experienced from the Imperial Government, did not allow themselves to be discouraged. The Moscow Slavonic Committee, founded immediately after the Congress of 1867, and its St. Petersburg branch, set up in the spring of 1868, were continually active in the years that followed. Among other activities, they established charitable societies, which educated young Slavs from the oppressed regions, and publishing houses, which produced books, dictionaries, maps, reviews, etc., intended to propagate the common ideal. Between 1875 and 1878 the two organisations were very much in favour in Russian society; millions of roubles flowed into the collections sponsored by them; Aid Committees came to the assistance of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina; arms were sent to the Christians in revolt against Islam; a legion of Russian

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Club) and the *Skupshtina*. But only secondary questions were dealt with, to be re-examined—without any more practical result—in the following month in Prague. These questions included the creation of a Slavonic Bank, a Slavonic Telegraphic Agency, the preparation of an Exhibition, the extension of Sokolism. . . . The time of heroic debates had passed.

Then, in the speculations founded on an identical destiny for the Slavonic community, there was one disturbing element—Poland. Towards that country, Tsarist Russia displayed implacable aversion. Had she pursued a really Slavonic policy, she would have tried to utilise the powerful factor formed by the persecuted Poles beyond her own frontiers. A Slavonic policy would have succeeded in making of Russian Poland, governed with tolerance and understanding, a centre of attraction, if not for Little Poland (where the Viennese policy of Austro-Polonism gave the illusion of some measure of individuality), at least for the savagely persecuted Poles in East Prussia, in Posnania, and in Upper Silesia.

For their part the Poles were inclined to think that there existed only two Slavonic peoples, Russia and themselves, and, of the principles of Slavism, to grasp only that directed against Germany.

It was precisely in the measure in which she appealed to the Slavonic idea that Russia caused them uneasiness. As for the other Slavonic peoples, their relations with them were only occasional. *Bohemi Polonorum infestissimi inimici* ran an old saying. The seventy-seven Polish deputies who made up the *Kolo Polsko*, and together stood for all the parties represented in the Reichsrat, rarely cast their votes with those of the Slav bloc formed by the Czech, Slovene, Serbo-Croat parties of Istria and Dalmatia. Yet the Slavonic Union of 1907 proved—though for a very short time—that, with them, the Slavs would have secured an absolute majority in the Parliament of Vienna. The *Kolo Polsko* adopted a realistic and short-sighted policy; its members derived temporary advantages, but consolidated a régime which the other Slavs declared to be inhuman and condemned by the evolution of the modern world. The Poles saw the Serbs only as Orthodox Christians and vassals of the Russians. They boycotted the last Slav Congresses, in order not to sit at the same table as the Russians. In 1911, the Serbs succeeded in

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186* •563 648 getting them to attend the Slavonic Press Congress which was held during the summer in Belgrade. A characteristic incident spoiled the atmosphere of this gathering. The Poles agreed to attend the banquet offered to the members of the Congress only on condition that the Imperial hymn, *Boje Tsaria Khranyi,* should not be played. In an attempt to conciliate all parties, it was agreed not to play either the Russian or the Polish hymn, but to replace them with the Panslav hymn, *Ei Sloveni.* But no one had thought of the fact that this is sung to the same tune as that of Dabrowsky's hymn, *Jeszcze Polska nie zginela* ('Poland is not lost'). Hence an altercation between Poles and Russians, with the result that the latter refused to take part in the proposed outing to the Iron Gates.

It was jokingly said in Belgrade that the Poles were first and foremost Poles, then Catholics, and Slavs when they had time. Yet Bethmann-Hollweg, as President of the Prussian Council in 1912, had, by his famous Expropriation Law, reawakened among the Poles the feeling of a community of destiny with the Slavs. In the Prussian Landtag Korfanty exclaimed, 'At a time when, in the Balkans, the cannon is thundering for the liberation of the Slavs, we Poles, Slavs in Prussia, are the victims of a fresh act of vile oppression and persecution'.

But the Russians did not wish, or did not know how to profit by these divisions. The idea of easing the situation came to them too late, at the time of the First World War, after Pilsudski had organised the 'legions' in Krakow, and the P.O.W. (*Polska organizacya wojskowa*), the Polish secret organisation in Russia; it was only then that Grand-Duke Nicholas proclaimed the hypothetical independence of Poland.

186* 771 The first Russian Slavophiles' die-hard attitude in matters of religion greatly contributed to disturbing the currents of sympathy between Muscovites and the Slavs of Central Europe. Yet denominational differences were not calculated to alarm the Czechs. In 1848, the populace of Prague crammed Wenceslas Square to hear the Serbian Archpriest, Stamatovich, sing the office of the Orthodox rite; a wave of emotion passed through them when the celebrant intoned the *Gospodi pomiluj* for the repose of the soul of John Hus and of Zizka, the hero of the Hussite Tabor. The fact was that the Serbs, not very much given to mysticism, saw the faith chiefly as a counterpart of

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national sentiment. It is not irrelevant to mention that the Orthodox Slavs of the Balkans are the least practising of Orthodox Christians, among whom it is the Serbs who have the largest number of unbelievers. It is said that, for a given number of inhabitants, there would be six times as many churches in Greece as in Serbia, four times as many in Rumania, and twice as many in Bulgaria.

Muscovite Slavism differed from Czech Slavism not only in its internal tendencies but in its psychological structure. The patient mysticism of the Russians aimed at achievements on the basis of a millenary evolution. The Czechs, of less nebulous mentality and of intense volitional power, sought immediate results. In Moscow they talked of the divine mission of Eastern Christianity; in Prague, of the boycotting of German goods and the disposal of the products of Czech industry. Between two nations with such a differing mental outlook, it was difficult to maintain concomitant moral action for very long.

The breach became apparent when the Czech, Karel Kramár, created the 'Neo-Slavism' which held its first Assembly in Prague in May, 1908. A Pole, Roman Dnowski, and a Bulgarian, Stevan Bobtchev, were in agreement with him to rejuvenate the old Slavonic ideal under a new climate. It was a doctrine tending towards cultural unity and the spiritual and economic collaboration of all Slavs, without distinction of religion, and on a footing of perfect equality. An anti-hegemonic conception of Slav solidarity thus replaced 'Russo-Orthodox-Panslavism', relegated to the order of romantic myths. It seemed to provide the positive basis and the practical aims which agreement among Slavs had always lacked.

But, among the other Slav peoples, this movement did not meet with the success its founder anticipated. Too many of these peoples still had to contend with foreign domination. Kramár more or less approved the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Dual Monarchy. He saw in it the legalisation of a state of things which implied an increase in the number, and therefore in the influence, of the Slavs within Austria-Hungary; it was for the inverse reason that the German Liberals in Austria had, thirty years earlier (1878), unleashed furious opposition to the occupation of these same provinces. But bound up with this question were the security and the independence of the Serbian

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Anglo-Saxon, or Latin nations. The treaties of the earlier war had thus sanctioned a traditional exclusiveness in this respect.

On the other hand, Slavism scored a point—the only one—in an acquisition of territory. This was achieved by the clauses which allocated to the Czechs Sub-Carpathian Russia—an ethnical mosaic, with predominant Russian or Ukrainian elements, which was to form an autonomous unit within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic. This allocation, demanded by the Ruthenians of America, was decided upon chiefly because the signatories to the treaties considered the Prague government as the best mentor they could give to a dangerously backward Slavonic population. Indeed, Czechoslovakia was, within a few years, to improve Sub-Carpathia, that Cinderella of the Slavonic world; at the cost of heavy budgetary sacrifices, she turned this territory entrusted to her into a real 'Civilisation Front'.

As is well known, at the Peace Conference the Czechoslovaks intervened—another gesture of pure Slavonic inspiration—to try to secure for the Serbs of Lusatia the benefit of the protection accorded to minorities. These Lusatians are the remnant of a powerful tribe who people a corner of Saxony and Brandenburg, with its centre at Bautzen. Theirs was for long the *terra incognita* of the Slavonic world; they were discovered by the learned circles of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the nineteenth century.

The return of Poland to an independent life, and the Sovietisation of the Russian State, modified the nature of the relations between the two peoples. Immediately after the earlier war and the Treaty of Riga, one could not say that these relations had been clarified. It is certain that the Government of Moscow was then pursuing a Eurasiatic policy, which drew it away from European affairs. But no one could imagine that this disinterestedness would last very long. In Moscow they still, as under the Tsars, spoke of the 'Jesuitism' and the 'Jagellonism' of the Poles; in Warsaw, they talked about the hegemonic appetite of Russia, and her propaganda. 'Atheism' and 'Marxism' had replaced 'Orthodoxy' and 'Panslavism' as passwords.

The Polish-Sovietic War of 1920 complicated inter-Slav relations. The Poles bitterly reproached the Czechs with having refused

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that in neither of these capitals did they suspect that the big Slav brother would one day re-awaken from the dead, and become once more a factor of prime importance in world politics.

Already, at the Genoa Conference, Chicherin and the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nintchich, had, unknown to their colleagues, held conferences *in camera*, discussing the international situation, not as plenipotentiaries, but, according to Chicherin's own expression, 'among Slavs'.

The question of official relations with Russia was brought forward for the first time in July, 1924, by the ephemeral government presided over by the democratic leader, Davidovich. In his ministerial declaration the latter alluded to the expediency of contact 'with Sister Russia' (*bratska Rusija*). But it was then only a pious hope. This question was complicated by the presence in Belgrade of a powerful 'white' emigration (to which Wrangel belonged),[7] and of a 'legation', directed by Strandtman (the former Chargé d'Affaires of Tsarist Russia), in his capacity as 'General Delegate of Russian Emigration'.

A few months later, on the orders of Moscow, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, Bessiedovsky, approached Simich, the Yugoslav Minister in that capital. These overtures seem to have been the result of the visit which Stiepan Radich, the Croat agrarian leader, made to Moscow during the summer of 1924. The Muscovites had visualised Radich as the possible artisan of a peasant revolution in Yugoslavia, but he disappointed them by his muddle-headed fluency of speech and his absence of positive views. They dubbed him a 'little Leftist Bourgeois, hopping all over the place'. Nor did they derive more benefit from the Simich-Bessiedovsky discussions, revived shortly afterwards by the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin with Balougdjich, the representative of Yugoslavia. Nothing came of these private talks. It needed the Hitlerian nightmare and the Czech drama to restore—too late—the official relations between Belgrade and Moscow to their historical setting.

On the Slavonic side Czechoslovakia was the State most ready to give prompt recognition to the Soviet State. In this

[7] Generals, Slavophiles, prelates like the ex-Metropolitan of Kiev, Mgr. Antoine, had fled to Belgrade, where rest the ashes of General Alexeiev and of Wrangel. Philosophers and scholars sought shelter, for preference, in Czechoslovakia.

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186* 648 Prague and Belgrade should be of the same quality as those existing between Warsaw and Bucharest, or between Belgrade and Warsaw—which no one can claim to be the case. Rather, it is precisely regarding the manner of averting the Teutonic peril that Czechs and Yugoslavs have held views which, if not conflicting, were at least divergent: in Prague they feared a restoration of the Habsburgs more than the *Anschluss*, while the reverse was the case in Belgrade.

To the credit side of the relations between Belgrade and Prague must be put the action, both sentimental and positive, of the Slovene statesmen and propagandists, many of whom, [665] moreover, had studied in Bohemia. Immediately after the First World War, Abbé Korochetz' Popular Party (Catholic), which had come under the influence of the Czech Popular Party (*Lidova Strana*), was the one which, in its organ, the *Slovenets*, dealt most fully with questions relating to the Serbo-Bulgarian reconciliation and with Soviet Russia. The Czech Government was for a time tempted to intervene as mediator in the dispute between Belgrade and Sofia. It wisely abstained; the Serbs would certainly have been offended. At least its press always treated this dispute with tact and discretion.

Summing-up, let us say that, between the two wars, the atmosphere of the Czech-Yugoslav relations was one of the positive factors in the spirit of Slav solidarity.

* * *

If the Russo-Polish relations (and, in a certain measure, the Polish-Czech) are the touchstone of this solidarity in Central Europe, in the South-East it is through the Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations that crises are manifested. We have defined the place that Bulgaria, a Slavicised rather than a Slav people,[12] holds in the ethnical community, and the alternations of Russophilia and Russophobia through which she has passed. In 1915 she • 563

[12] It will be remembered, however, that in 1933, when MM. Gömbös and Kanya, respectively Hungarian Chairman of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, returned from Sofia (where Gömbös had conferred, in the Serbo-Croat language, with Mouchanov, the Bulgarian President), they declared to the Hungarian newspapers that they had 'visited Bulgaria, a country related to them by blood'. The Bulgarian press was unanimous in protesting against this expression; Bulgars and Magyars can be friends, but not relatives. The argument of ethnical relationship (Finnish) had nevertheless been put forward by certain Bulgarian propagandists in 1916–1917; it was the time when the poet Cyrille Kristov called himself a 'Tartaro-Bulgar'.

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Then there is the 'Balkan fact', with all that it implies of suspicion and particularities. It is commonly explained by the geographic configuration of the Peninsula, furrowed by valleys which have no inter-communication. No doubt the physical relief tends to perpetuate the clan spirit throughout all the various changes of sovereignty. But the ethnical variety does not give an exhaustive image of the Balkan mentality. Nor does the long practice of the *Divide ut imperes* principle, which was the Alpha and Omega of the Habsburg policy in the Balkans. These States, before becoming the successors to Austria-Hungary, were the heirs of Byzantium, and we may wonder whether the passion-charged atmosphere, the complex of distrust and turbulence which characterise them, are not a survival of Byzantine influence, in opposition to that Roman continuity and that tendency to universalism whose determining effects on Western civilisation have been analysed by Fustel de Coulanges, Dopsch and Pirenne.

* * *

An event of incalculable significance for the Slavonic world occurred about the year 1933: the reappearance of Moscow on the European diplomatic stage—coinciding, if not tallying, with the rehabilitation by the Soviets of national values in Russian history.

In its critical years, the Bolshevist régime had relegated the racial idea to the status of romantic nonsense. 'Slavophilia', frowned upon as it was by the last Tsarist governments, still had about it an odour of reactionary and religious mysticism which would have been sufficient to keep it on the black-list, even had the idea of ethnical solidarity found a place in Marxist terminology. On the other hand, the policy of nationalities pursued by the U.S.S.R. had breathed new life into hitherto inorganic or unrecognised ethnical groups. In the time of the Tsars, who would have dreamed that Russia comprised no less than fifty nationalities or ethnical groups? It would have been ill-timed to give these people the impression that there existed in the U.S.S.R. a privileged race, whose traditions or ambitions dominated the life of the country, relegating the allogeneous republics to the condition of satellites. Decentralisation diluted Russian Slavism, and the plurality of tongues favoured by the Socialist Revolution deprived it of its trump card.

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to do with the protesting prelates,[11] or openly dissociated themselves from their attitude.

By way of retort, the first number of the *Moscow Patriarchy* published a message from the Council of Russian Bishops, assembled for the election, inviting Christians to pray for the victory of the Red Army and the fulfilment of the scriptural text invoked by Alexander Nevsky: 'He who strikes with the sword shall perish by the sword'. On September 8, this same Council had excommunicated 'as adversaries of the Cross of the Lord, all who have been guilty of treason to the common cause of the Church and gone over to Fascism'; the bishops and clergy guilty on this head were removed from their sacred office.

* * *

To conclude, the only obstacles to a general reconciliation of the Slavonic peoples came from the Poles. To summarise here the vicissitudes of Soviet-Polish relations since the pact of December, 1941, would mean not only relating the most stormy chapter in the Allies' war diplomacy, but also recalling the relations of the various groups among the Polish exiles, the antagonism between the London Committee and that of Lublin, the frontier problem, and also the perhaps more tragic problem of the political, religious, and social concepts on the basis of which the Polish State was to be re-born. Once again it was made very clear that Poland occupied a place apart on the map of the Slavonic world, and formed an obstacle to the realisation of full Slav solidarity.

Like the other Slavonic States, however, she had been caught up in the advance of the Russian armies sweeping across Eastern Europe—an onrush which settled the fate of the Slav nations, with or without their consent, as a consequence of their liberation. For three or four years Germany had been the second Slavonic power in the world. She had imposed on her Serbian, Croatian, Slovak, and Bulgarian satellites not only the horrors of the occupation, but also ideologies strongly opposed to their temperaments and their history; an impersonal and tyrannical idea of the State, a 'New Order' which was nothing but a hypocritical subjection, anti-Semitism which—with the exceptions of Poland and Imperial Russia—the Slavonic nations had always regarded with horror. When the collapse came, all these nations turned

[11] Among these, however, we must include the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Argentine.

[J. Poland - Analyst]

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A sceptic might have observed that, despite the oratorical manifestations of harmony and goodwill, three specifically Slav problems which had arisen in 1919 still appeared on the agenda of questions at issue in 1946—the allocation of the Teschen Basin, the definitive status of Macedonia, the fate of the Lusatian Serbs.

Indeed, the Macedonian question does not seem to have been finally settled by the creation of a Macedonian Republic within the framework of the Yugoslav Federation. That is why, at the end of 1946, Yugoslav newspapers demanded the incorporation of the Bulgarian districts (Petrich, Gornya-Djumaïa, Nevrekop) in the Popular Republic of Macedonia, and reproached the new Bulgarian constitution with submitting every project for the transfer of territory to the decision of the legislature—a step which Belgrade considered as a stipulation derogatory to the 'Macedonian minority's' right to self-determination.[2] In other words, in Yugoslavia the Macedonian population of Bulgaria was still considered as non-Bulgarian in character. Latent, but still discernible, it was the old quarrel which had, for half a century, set the two peoples in opposition to each other. It was recalled in the Sobranje on December 12, by an Agrarian Deputy, who asked the Government whether it did not consider the Yugoslav claims as an interference in Bulgarian Home Affairs. And early in 1947 a much-talked-of action brought at Skoplje plainly pointed to the survival of the famous ORIM (Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organisation) directed by Vanka Mihaïlov—that organisation which had been so widely discussed at the conclusion of the previous war.

[2] An action which the French Press Agency described (on January 27, 1947) as 'typically Macedonian' was brought against Albanians, Yugoslavs of Albanian or Turkish origin and 'real Macedonians', accused of having organised, in 1945, an illegal society—*National Chiptare Demokratia*—to overthrow the Albanian Government of Enver Hodja and set up a 'Great Albania', including a part of Western Macedonia, with Kossovo and Metova. The conspirators were in league with Mihaïlov's Revolutionary Committee—the famous ORIM (Macedonian International Revolutionary Organisation), whose hand had already been detected in a separatist Macedonian plot which had been judged in November 1946. In this plot was involved no less a person than Metodijé Andorov Cento, one of the most popular figures among the Macedonian 'partisans' and, up to the spring of 1946, President of the Macedonian Liberation Assembly. Cento was sentenced to eleven years' hard labour. Decorated by Tito, he was in opposition to the Government, criticising its Communist affiliations, and in conflict with Lazar Koulichevsky, Prime Minister of the Macedonian legislature.

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666 175 result even exceeded the expectations of M. Gheorgiev, who took fright at the excitement stirred up in the country by the Communists—hence this appeal to the population: 'Victory often intoxicates men, and defeat makes them lose their self-control. Tension resulting from elections, if not rapidly mastered, may help to foster a state of excitement prejudicial to order and tranquillity. The Government earnestly exhorts all citizens strictly to observe the laws'.

Spectacular as was the triumph of governmental coalition, it did not reach the overwhelming majorities of which Russia and Yugoslavia held the secret. In particular, the ministerial fraction belonging to the *Zveno* was beaten, so that the country had modified, to the advantage of the Communists, the relative strengths within the coalition. Now, in a nation which had neither capitalism nor trusts nor large industrial concerns nor *latifundia*, the word *Communist* had a meaning which was much more political than social.* It was above all the victory of the 'Russianisers', long held in check by the official policy.

• [563] It must moreover be admitted that, renewing the gesture of the liberating Tsar, the Soviet Union had just saved the Bulgarian people by protecting them from the consequences of their rulers' collusion with the Axis. The question that still remained was whether Russia would not have preferred to be defended in Sofia by traditionally 'national' elements, rather than by a party too openly connected with Moscow, and whose leader, George Dimitrov, the hero of the Leipzig trial, was thought to be a tool of Russia.

642 175 As a logical consequence of the elections, a new Government was in fact formed by Dimitrov on November 23.[1] It included ten Communists, five Agrarians, two Socialists, two members of the *Zveno* and one Independent. The ex-President, Kimon Gheorgiev, held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The semi-official press saw it as 'the most democratic Government Bulgaria has ever had', whilst the Opposition emphasised the complete hold on power which the Communists had obtained.

648 175 This Government's vital tasks were to be signing the peace and voting the Constitution. On February 12, 1947, it secured

[162] * The working-class strengths, on which the Communists rely, are very small; indeed, 80% of the population are engaged in agriculture, not to mention tradesmen, civil servants, and members of the liberal professions.

1 [1946 - Analyst]

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648 175 ference, which, while treating her as a conquered country, nevertheless left her Southern Dobrudja which she had obtained from Rumania under a friendly agreement concluded under the auspices of the Axis.

728 175 By her memoranda addressed to the Four Powers on May 7 and June 20, she had asked to be designated in the peace treaties, not as an Axis 'Satellite State' but as a 'Co-belligerent Ally'. Her delegate to the Paris Conference maintained that the moral responsibility of the Bulgarian people had not been involved in the policy of collaboration with Germany,[11] that, moreover, no Bulgarian soldier had borne arms against the Red Army, and that the country's heroic resistance, at the critical moment of the war, entitled her to the Allies' sympathetic consideration.

This request was rejected, however, as well as that which aimed at securing access to the Aegean Sea (the famous 'outlet' of Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly) or, more clearly, that part of Western Thrace which had been under Bulgarian sovereignty between 1913 (Treaty of Bucharest) and 1919 (Treaty of Neuilly) and which, at the time of which we are speaking, formed part of Greece. This request, as well as the claim for indemnity for 'investments and improvements' effected by the Bulgarian troops on Greek soil during the occupation, at the Luxembourg Conference provoked vigorous reaction on the part of the Greek Premier, M. Tsaldaris, who reproached the Bulgarians with having attacked his country three times in the space of a single generation.

[648] Much more: Messrs. Byrnes and Bevin took the opportunity of M. Kolarov's visit to Paris to intimate to him the dissatisfaction their Governments felt at the way in which the • [563] Opposition was treated in Sofia. Moreover, the British delegate demanded the insertion of a special clause intended to protect Jewish minorities, although it was well known that—except in the last war, and even then, not without the exercise of great restraint[12]—the Jews had never been the object of discriminating measures.

[11] Almost word for word, this was the thesis maintained at the end of the previous war by M. Mollov, the Bulgarian delegate to the League of Nations: 'Bulgaria . . . was drawn into the war by events contrary to the manifest will of the majority of the people, and of the political parties'.

[12] The opposition of the Bulgarian people to racial laws spared the Jews the atrocities to which they were subjected in other Eastern European countries.

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accused the hierarchy, in connection with the Kielce pogrom,[18] of not having adopted a sufficiently bold attitude towards anti-Semitism, and of having refused to sign the declaration of all political parties, condemning this racial crime.

The Cardinal addressed to the foreign press declarations in which, while deploring the acts of violence, he attributed them largely 'to the dominant position assumed by the Jews in the Polish Government, and to the efforts made to give Poland a governmental structure that the majority of the country did not desire'. As may be imagined, these words aroused passionate comments. The same remark applies to the pastoral letter addressed to the faithful on the eve of the elections, asking them to vote only 'for persons, lists or programmes in favour of Catholic teaching and morals'. Without mentioning the Marxist Parties by name, the pastoral reminded Catholics that they must not belong to 'organisations whose principles are contrary to this teaching and this morality'. The Cardinal was anxious, he said, to 'reconcile the Christian faith with a sound revolutionary movement'.

* * *

It was in Czechoslovakia that the adaptation of political and social life to the new state of affairs was achieved with the minimum of clashes and the maximum of realism. The Second Republic was stabilised under the form of a 'Socialising Democracy' (according to President Benes's term), half-way between Communism and the Bourgeois State. It no longer had the same exterior structure as Masaryk's republic, having adopted a *sui generis* type of bi-national community, with equal rights for Czechs and Slovaks. There was another innovation—a still more vital one—the elimination of minorities, whose presence and militancy had hindered its development, before contributing to its dislocation under the Hitlerian onrush.

[18] In this locality,[1] on July 4, 1946, there was a pogrom, arising out of a trifling cause, in the course of which 45 Jews were massacred. Nine of the presumed authors of this massacre were condemned to death. The clandestine organisations were accused of having fomented anti-Semite passions, whereas, in reality, the latter had remained very much alive in Poland—as witness the testimony of Dr. Shoskes, South America's representative in the Society for Assistance to Jewish Immigrants, and M. Segal, delegate to the World Jewish Congress of New York. Despite the frightful losses they suffered during the occupation, which reduced them to an insignificant minority, the Polish Jews, for the most part, aspire to leave the country. This is one of the indirect aspects of the Palestinian problem.

[1] [in Kielce - Analyst]

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sent as Papal Nuncio. In November, Mgr. Joseph Beran, a Dachau deportee, was appointed Archbishop of Prague. Czechoslovakia was then the only Slav State having accredited diplomatic representation with the Holy See.

In Slovakia the clergy had to suffer from the fact that a priest, Joseph Tiso,[21] who succeeded Father Hlinka as Leader of a Peoples' Party, had controlled the so-called 'Independent' State under the Nazi occupation. In some cases, proceedings against 'collaborators' took on the aspect of an anti-Catholic drive; some Associations, and even some religious communities, were dissolved.

As regards foreign policy during this period, it was dominated by two questions, the claim on Teschen and the 'liquidation' of the Hungarian minorities. The Teschen problem has been dealt with above, in connection with Poland; we will simply remind the reader that the Prague Government was adamant in its claim. 'Czechoslovakia will not give up one scrap of Teschen', declared President Benes on July 18, 1946. The treaty of alliance of March 10 left the matter in suspense until 1949.

The evacuation of the Hungarian populations raised a bitter and prolonged dispute between Prague and Budapest.

An agreement concluded on February 27, 1946 provided for an exchange between Hungarians in Slovakia and Slovaks in Hungary, on a parity basis, to the number of 150,000 persons. The Government of Budapest was to make this agreement widely known amongst the Slovaks placed under its jurisdiction.

But the intention of the Czechs was to expel from their territory the whole of the Hungarian minority, which was far more numerous than the Slovak minority in Hungary.[22] And so they asked that country to take over 200,000 other members of the Magyar minority, and a further 60,000 Hungarian minority subjects, expelled as war criminals or political offenders. The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia who might escape these various transfers would be 're-Slovacised', and would cease to enjoy any minority privileges. Prague emphatically insisted that

[21] His trial opened on December 2, 194(5?) before the High Court of Bratislava.

[22] Out of the 645,000 Magyars who lived in Czechoslovakia in 1939, 110,000 were in Carpathian Ruthenia, ceded to the Russians. There remained 435,000, more than half of whom were considered to be 'inassimilable'.

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the minorities had been the instrument which had upset and dismembered Czechoslovakia, and that their complete elimination was an essential condition for the security of the new State.

Hungary resisted this claim. Apart from general humanitarian considerations, she maintained that it was economically impossible for her to meet the needs of such an increased population. First she asked for a frontier revision, which was categorically refused by Prague. Later on, the two Governments accused each other of sabotaging the February agreements. A joint commission was set up, to accelerate the exchange. Its work was interrupted in September, when the Czechs presented a demand for the expulsion of a further 70,000 persons. In that same month the matter was taken before the Political and Territorial Commission, charged by the Peace Conference with the preparation of the treaty with Hungary; it was connected with a Czech request for frontier rectification (extension of Bratislava on the right bank of the Danube)—a request which was naturally resisted by the Hungarians. The Commission, setting aside forcible solutions, urged the two countries to come to a direct understanding on the problems of the minorities; should such an agreement not be reached within six months, Czechoslovakia would be authorised to lay the matter before the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.[23]

The dispute broke out again in November, when the Hungarians remaining in Czechoslovakia were requisitioned and transferred, for the most part, to the Sudetenland, in virtue of the law for the mobilisation of man-power. A demand from Budapest for an explanation, dated March 23, was left unanswered by Prague, where it was considered that a general measure needed no justification. On November 21 the Hungarian National Assembly registered a solemn protest against these forcible displacements. This protest was echoed abroad, particularly in London, in the House of Lords, and in a section of the English and American press, which felt obliged to remind

[23] The *Magyar Hirlap*, the organ of the Prime Minister, Nagy, published an article on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations containing the following remarks: 'Between the two World Wars, the Government of Hungary considered that it ought to be the ally of the power which was the enemy of Czechoslovakia; but later on, it was realised that this power was the common enemy, and had enslaved Hungary as well as Czechoslovakia'.

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the Prague Government that the sufferings inflicted on the Hungarians did not compensate for those the Slovaks had endured; they simply increased the total amount of suffering.

Negotiations between the two Governments were resumed in January, 1947, following the visit of the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gyöngyösy, to Bratislava, where he met the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Clementis, and had with him a preliminary discussion in view of a general settlement of the problem. At that time a total of 11,655 Slovaks (as against the agreed figure of 40,000) had returned to Slovakia from Hungary; of these 3,535 had not been officially transferred, but had simply fled.

Exchanges of population were resumed from April 11 to 18, but on a very small scale, while settlement was taking place, in Bratislava, of the financial problems raised by these operations.

In the whole matter, Czechoslovakia had had Russia behind her. 'We have the support of the Soviet Union in the question of the minorities', said M. Gottwald. But we should fall short of the truth were we to omit to mention that Czechoslovakia's conduct was rather severely judged in the Anglo-American countries, where people were not very familiar with minority disputes, and attached too much importance to respect for the individual, to approve of these mass exoduses—at least in Europe.

The case of the German minority had been the object of Czechoslovak declarations, even before the end of the war, and on this point the Potsdam agreements had merely had to sanction the decision taken by M. Benes and his Ministers to create a homogeneous national State. Consequently, the expulsion of the Germans from the Sudetenland did not give rise to any disputes —eliciting, at the most, humanitarian recommendations on the part of the Western Allies. The 'ceiling' for the expulsions had been fixed at 2,500,000 by the Potsdam agreements; in October, 1946, 750,000 had been sent into the Russian zone, 1,415,135 into the American zone, and 310,000 were authorised to remain on Czech territory; these were skilled workmen, miners, anti-Fascists, relatives of Czechs, old or sick people.[24] There is no

[24] It should be noted that Czechoslovakia adopted a special treatment for Germans of Austrian nationality residing or temporarily domiciled in her territory. She did not class them with the Sudeten Germans as necessarily to be expulsed, unless they had been members of the Nazi Party.

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doubt that, although their departure corresponded to a legitimate policy of internal peace and security, yet it created in Czech economic life a void that was difficult to fill.

The Americans' remarks on the subject of the deportations were not the only cause (and, in any case, they were passing ones) of the frigid relations between themselves and the Prague Government. The latter had negotiated and obtained a loan of fifty million dollars from the Export-Import Bank—a loan which was to help to finance the 'two-year plan' for Czechoslovakia's economic reconstruction. On October 16 the State Department notified that they had blocked this credit for an indefinite period, because the borrowing country had not provided any compensation for American nationals dispossessed by nationalisation. Another argument advanced was the cutting and, at the very least, injudicious tone adopted by certain Czech newspapers which, at the very moment when their Government was seeking financial aid, accused the United States of using credits as an instrument of economic imperialism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed the Russians for the latter accusation and expressed regret at Washington's decision.

On the other hand, in November, 1946, England granted a loan of two and a half million sterling, spread over four years, to enable Czechoslovakia to buy surplus British materials. So that Prague's fears of a synchronised Anglo-American policy in the matter of loans were allayed.

[186] Like those of Poland, Czechoslovakia's aims in the discussion on the German treaty were chiefly directed towards disarmament and denazification of the Reich. For the Czechs, the problem of their security was partly settled by the presence of Soviet Russia in the Danube Basin. The dream of one of their thinkers had come true: 'The lime, our Slavonic emblem,[25] is supported by the powerful Russian oak'. And, celebrating the anniversary of the pact of December 12, 1943, between Stalin and Benes, the *Nurodni Ozvobozeni* declared: 'Treaties are usually entered into for a fixed period. Afterwards, they are extended, or they lapse. This one must stand for eternity'.

[25] The lime was the emblem of the Slavs. At the time of the riots which took place in Ljubljana at the beginning of this century between German and Slovene students, the former sported a cornflower and the latter a lime-leaf.

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Human exoduses afforded the solution of the minority problems, which the 1919–1920 treaties had endeavoured to settle by the establishment of *ad hoc* international law. In short, it was a return to the policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In this conception of European statics lay the sole innovation brought about by the latest peace treaties. Is it progress or the reverse? Whatever we may think, from the humane point of view, of this over-simplified settlement of a complex problem, we are obliged to admit that, as time goes on, it will consolidate the physical bases of the new order and ensure its duration.

Let us hasten to add, however, that scarcely were the treaties signed, when a campaign for their revision was launched. For perhaps the first time in history, this campaign included victors and vanquished, victims and beneficiaries of the new state of affairs. The Yugoslavs maintained their claim to Julian Venetia, Carinthia, and, more discreetly (at least before the international forum), to Aegean or Greek Macedonia. The Bulgarians returned to the attack, with a view to obtaining a territorial outlet on the Aegean—a claim they had relentlessly pressed between the two wars. Hungary, who again saw Eastern Transylvania eluding her grasp, maintained her traditional attitude on revision. It was difficult for Rumania to forget that, after Germany, she was the chief victim of the war. If Polish official circles, for reasons easily understood, did not raise their voices, it was not because that country willingly accepted the loss of her Eastern Marches, whose inhabitants had been 'invited' to settle on the evacuated borders of Prussia and Silesia.

The 1947 treaties settled the two problems on which formerly depended the peace of Europe—the relative strengths of the Germany-Poland-Russia trinomial, and Balkan equilibrium.

Both these problems were settled, without right of appeal, by Russia, the victorious liberator. The axiom formulated by M. Gyöngösy, a Hungarian Minister, applies here: 'In crucial periods of her history, a small nation has no liberty of choice'.

The first of these problems was solved in such a way as to ensure security for Poland, at the price of her diplomatic liberty. It used to be maintained in Warsaw that the Poles could be fully masters of their fate only on condition that Germany and Russia should be neither allies nor enemies—a formula which was as

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648 175 687 The Yugoslav Government replied by trying, in Sarajevo, some White Russians, naturalised Soviet citizens, who, after having served the occupying authorities during the war, were said to have become agents for anti-Tito propaganda; on December 9 they were condemned to imprisonment for a term of years.

648 175 In the shade of Soviet-Yugoslav antagonism, the old quarrel between Belgrade and Sofia over Macedonia was reawakened.

Early in August, 1947, Tito and Dimitrov met at Bled and signed a protocol providing for closer collaboration between the two Governments: this protocol was to find its application in the 'pact of collaboration and mutual assistance' concluded on November 27 following, at Euxinograd.

648 563 175 [185] Yet, at Bled, there were signs of disagreement. Tito would have liked to see the formation of a Federation of Southern Slavs. But such a federation would imply the inclusion of Bulgarian Macedonia in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—which would have the effect of committing the Macedonians in Bulgaria to a policy for the future, on the lines of the old Serbian aspirations. Dimitrov shelved the solution of the Macedonian problem until the federal pact should be concluded. The Yugoslavs then insisted that psychological conditioning for the union should be ensured by the granting of 'cultural rights' to the Macedonians in Bulgaria. Now the Sofia Government refused to consider the latter as a minority, and therein lay the germ of the new Bulgarian-Yugoslav crisis.

Later, on December 20, 1948, after the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture, Blagoje Neskovitch, Vice-President of the Belgrade Government, was to claim that the quarrel unleashed by the Kominform arose simply out of the pressure brought to bear by the Bulgarian leaders, with a view to securing recognition of their territorial claims on Vardar Macedonia.

Then Belgrade reproached the Bulgarian Popular Republic with having refused a statute of autonomy and the designation of a 'nationality' to the Pirine Macedonians.

648 175 Thereafter the Macedonian Question remained in the forefront of Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations: a Macedonian, Poptomov, became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Sofia and, when Bulgaria denounced the pact of November 27, 1947, Yugoslavia accused her of violating the peace treaty by refusing to pay the repara-

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helplessness; Benes capitulated before Gottwald's ultimatum. It was the end of the Putsch which Hubert Ripka later described as a 'prefabricated revolution'. On March 9[1] Jean Masaryk, Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a personal letter to Stalin, in which he denounced the intervention of Zorine, the Soviet Ambassador, in the events of February: 'When a time of mortal danger for the country, and for all Slavs, comes, you will have in Prague nothing but a Government hated by the country, despised by the *élite*, and relying entirely on the bayonets of its police organisations'. The next day Masaryk committed suicide: contradictory versions of his death were circulated, although the above-mentioned letter had made clear his intention of ending his life.

Thus the inspirer of two Czech liberations, heir to the thought of Thomas Masaryk, disappeared in shameful oblivion; the commentaries in the Communist press, in which he was later accused of having betrayed the interests of the country, lead us to wonder whether his inglorious end did not save him from an even more tragic fate. Posterity will pronounce a mixed judgment on his political achievement. His tomb might fittingly have been engraved with this epitaph, taken from one of his books (*Whither the Slavs?*): 'The existence and the prosperity of all the Slav States is inseparably bound up with a régime of true democracy, that is to say, a régime in which the elementary principles of individual liberty, liberty of conviction, liberty of religion, liberty of political expression and liberty of public opinion, are guaranteed and fully respected'.

As for Benes, whose authority was henceforth without scope, on June 7, 'for health reasons', he resigned his presidential office, which he had held since June 19, 1946, in a message by which he invited his fellow-citizens 'to encourage liberty and consciously enjoy it'. He died a few months later, on September 3, 1948.

The events of February were to be mentioned at the United Nations Security Council, with a view to appointing a commission of inquiry—which was opposed by a Soviet veto (May 24).

On March 9, 1948, was voted the Constitution which made Czechoslovakia a 'democratic peoples' republic'. It instituted a Single House system, and proclaimed the equality of Czechs and Slovaks: the republic was to be a bi-national State. Unlike

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642 175 563 the preceding Constitutions, this one contained no clause designed to protect minorities.

[666] The elections, postponed until May 30,[1] gave 88 per cent of the votes (6,429,145) to the National Front, but the figure of 770,100 blank voting slips exceeded that anticipated by the Government. The latter was, however, fully master of the situation. On June 14 Clement Gottwald was elected President of the Republic, on the unanimous vote of the 296 deputies present. Under the chairmanship of Zapotocki, he formed a Cabinet on the lines of the previous one (sixteen Communists or supporters, and six non-Communists); the portfolio of Foreign Affairs remained in the hands of Klementis, who replaced Masaryk. The new Head of the Government announced implacable repressive action against 'those guilty of disorder or confusion, who seek to hinder the reconstruction of the country'.

[661] 659 798 175 Indeed, during the months that followed, there was a vigorous purging of diplomacy, the army, the police. But, in 1949, it was the religious question which was to dominate political life, owing to an offensive conducted against the Roman Church, opposing the old Czech Hussite spirit to Catholicism, the dominant trait in the Slovak national character.

Gottwald and his ministers, relying on this 'religious geography' peculiar to Czechoslovakia, embarked upon a struggle with the clergy in the domain of monopoly of the schools. They pursued the contest by seeking to alienate the Catholic Church from her natural hierarchy, and by encouraging the 'schism' of the Czech 'National' Church. To protest against the obstacles put in the way of the exercise of the cult, the bishops drew up a pastoral letter, setting forth the conditions required in order to regularise relations between the Church and the State. The Government forbade the distribution of the pastoral; infringements of this decree, specially numerous in Slovakia, were sternly repressed. Mgr. Beran, Archbishop of Prague, was detained in his palace; the civil authority created 'Catholic Action', an official organisation placed under the control of priests with Communist leanings. At the head of this movement was the Minister of Public Health, Father Plojhar, suspended by the ecclesiastical authorities for having sought a legislative mandate without his bishop's permission.

Tension rose with the 'resolutions' passed on June 28 by the

1 [1948--Analyst]

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especially poetry, even if it be the popular poetry. A synthesis appears absolutely impossible. It would be enough to compare the Czech versification and all the changes it went through with the Russian and Polish to see how great are the differences. Let us take the Russian *byliny* with their assonances, which have no correspondents in other Slavic productions. On the other hand the *Shchedrivky* and the *Koladki* are ritual poems often inspired by historical subjects of a purely Ukrainian character. A quite distinct group is represented by the Serbo-Croatian and Bulgaro-Macedonian popular poetry—heroic rhapsodies which sing of the legendary Serbian hero Kralević Marko, the mother of the Jugović and her sons and many others. This poetry which served the fantasies and mystifications of Mérimée, which enchanted Goethe, Pushkin, Mickiewicz and Nodier, represents a quite special formation and a unique genre in the Slavic world. How different is the medieval Polish poetry, only semi-popular in its most distant origins, with its origin in the Church. Its lyrical starting point is to be found in the *Kyrie Eleison* and *Alleluiah*, refrains of liturgical songs.

Let us abandon for a moment this purely philological statement and turn to a more essential factor which determined the historical development of the Slavic nations: I have in mind religion. Religion divided the whole Slavic world into two parts. Bulgarians, Serbians, Great Russians, Ukrainians, and White Ruthenians embraced Eastern Orthodoxy from a Byzantine source. Czechs, Croatians, Slovenes, Slovaks, and Poles embraced the Catholic religion from its Roman Source. And in addition the Czechs went through Hussism; a part of the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians adopted the Union. The Muscovite Slavophils and Panslavists were fighting against Catholicism. By that very fact they were in opposition to the whole Western Slavic world. Religion determined the cultural differentiation, and if we add to that some other historical factors we shall see that at the time when Russia was under the influence of Byzantium, of the Bulgarian and Serbian messianistic literature which formed her

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theory of "Moscow the Third Rome," based on all kinds of imported legends and apocryphas, Poland was shining in the sun of the Renaissance. She had her Rabelais—Nicholas Rey, her Ronsard—Kochanowski, and a wonderfully rich and brilliant political literature connected with Latin republican writers, some of which was soon translated into foreign languages, even English.

The Southwestern Slavs, the Croatians, Slovenes, and Dalmatians also took part in the achievements of the Renaissance. They lived that period in contact with Italy while on the other hand Dalmatia was under the influence of several Byzantines. Let me recall the brilliant Italianism of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the flowering of the Dalmatian literature which followed the songs of the provencals troubadours, and of the *Dolce stil nuovo*. The Dalmatian muses found their inspiration in Petrarch, Boccaccio, Guarini, Tasso, Metastasio; this literature knew all genres from *canzone* to the pastoral drama and *la commedia dell' arte*. The Czechs went through this epoch carrying their religious reform—a heavy burden but rich in immense moral consequences. It is probably this reform that gave the definitive form to the moral and intellectual character of this Slavophil and Slavologist nation, least Slavic in its spiritual physiognomy.

The marvellous flowering of the Russian and Polish literatures in the nineteenth century represents again a kind of exception among the Slavic nations. And in spite of a close parallel development, these two literatures very often, following the same roads of literary evolution, in many ways contrast with each other.[89]

So even if one should try to eliminate the purely political barriers separating the Slavic nations, such as the political antagonisms existing between Bulgars and Serbs, Serbs and Croatians, Russians and Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Ukrainians and Great Russians, Ukrainians and Poles, etc., the problem of spiritual

[89] I have discussed these problems in a more detailed form in my article, "Existe-t-il un patrimoine commun d'études slaves?" Cf. *Le Monde Slave*, Paris, 1926.

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unity among the Slavs would still appear very difficult. The cultural differentiation in the march of historical development became so deep that the parental affinities in the Slavic family have been completely lost. And today the cultural type of a Russian differs greatly from the cultural Polish type, and this would be true for all other Slavic examples.

How significant, although in part paradoxical in the light of the events of this war, are the following remarks of Vladimir Solov'ev: "Poland is in Eastern Europe the representative of the spiritual principle which became the basis of Western history. In its spiritual essence the Polish nation, and with it all Catholic Slavs, belong to the Western world. The spirit is stronger than blood; in spite of a blood antipathy toward Germans and blood nearness to Russia, the representatives of Polonism would accept Germanization rather than a union with Russia. A Western European, even a Protestant, is nearer by spirit to a Catholic Pole than an Orthodox Russian. Being the foremost fighters for Western principles, Poles see in Russia the East, hostile to their spiritual essence, an alien and dark force. . . ."[99] "The East," says Solov'ev, "worked out an order of ideas in which man was subordinated to supernatural power. The West created the ideal of the independence of man. In the East the state enslaved the peoples, while Greece elaborated the ideal of the freedom of the peoples. The supernatural element and the predominance of the state have given rise to the idea of resignation. Greece and Rome with their republics developed the principle of spiritual energy and popular activity." (Cf. *ibid.*)

Cultural differentiation represents progress, and the idea of racial unification might be considered as essentially reactionary. And indeed the Panslavistic doctrine is an anti-historical, anti-cultural, and anti-European idea, not only because of its anti-European political implications but because Panslavism refers first of all to theories of racial superiority, supporting them by dubious

[99] V. S. Solov'ev, *Velikii Spor i Khristianskaya Politika.* Cf. *Sobr. Soch.* v, IV, 15.